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RECENT IMPORTANT DECISIONS.*
Situs of Taxation.-The familiar Ewald case, decided in 168
Ky. 71, 171 Ky. 509 and 172 Ky. 451, was recently settled by the
U. S. Supreme Court in an opinion by Mr. Justice Holmes. Ewald
was domiciled in Louisville, Ky., although his business connections
were at St. Louis, Mo. The profits from this business together with
other funds were deposited in St. Louis banks, "subject to Ewald's
order alone. They were not used in the business and belonged ab-
solutely to him." The Kentucky courts having upheld the assess-
ment of this personalty in Kentucky, the Supreme Court held it to
be "the state's affair, not to be interfered with by the United
States, and therefore that a State may tax a man for a debt due
from a resident of another State."
Fidelity and Columbia Trust Co., Executor, v. City of Louisville.
U. S. Adv. Ops. 1917, page 45.
Statutory Camouflage Unconstitutional.-The notorious bonded
debt of Taylor County, Kentucky, has again been the subject of liti-
gation in the case of Hendrickson v. Apperson, U. S. Adv. Ops., 1917,
page 26. The law providing for the appointment of a collector of
taxes in that county was amended so as to authorize the appoint-
ment of several collectors, each charged with the duty of collecting
some designated part of the county revenues. The obvious effect
of the amendment would be to defeat judicial process and avoid
payment of an admitted obligation.
Since the statute as amended would prevent the enforcement
of the rights of the holder of a bond issued by the county before
the enactment of the amendment; and since the laws existing when
and where the contract was made and where it was to be performed
are a part of the contract-a law providing for the enforcement of
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the contract being of the essence of the obligation-therefore, the
amendment is unconstitutional as a violation of Article 1, Section
10, of the Federal Constitution.
Eminent Domain Paramount.-A contract between. the State
and a charitable institution forbade the opening of a roadway
'through the grounds of the latter without the consent of its au-
thorities. A municipal corporation under power conferred upon it
by the State, attempted by the right of eminent domain to acquire
a passway through said grounds. Was the exercise of this right
a violation of the contract clause of the Constitution of the United
States? Held, that the power of eminent domain was so inherently
governmental in character and so essential for the public welfare
that it was not susceptible of being abridged by agreement, and
the rightto take property by eminent domain "embraces within it-
self, as the part is contained in the whole, any supposed right of
contract limiting or restraining that authority."
Contributors to the Pa.. Hospital' v. City of Philadelphia. U. S.
Adv. Ops., 1917, page 55.
Blue-stocking Alimony Exem.ted.-The opinion of the Supreme
Court delivered by Mr. Justice McReynolds in the case of Gould
v. Gould, U. S. Adv. Ops., 1917, page 65, was that alimony.paid to
a divorced wife under a decree of court is not subject to an income
tax under the Federal statute enacted in pursuance of the Sixteenth
Amendment.
Property Right in News.-After a press association publishes
news in one or more localities, but its other members have not re-
ceived it, does the association relinquish its right to the exclusive
transmission of said news? Held, that news having a commercial
value is property entitled to full protection of law, and the prop-
erty ri)ghts of the press association are not lost by publication, until
all the members thereof have received said news.
Associated Press v. Int. News 8ervie6, 245 Fed. 244.
Recent Important Decisions 127
1
A Little State Power Still.-That the power of the Federal gov-
ernment does not extend to the suppression of brothels, bawdy
houses, etc., was declared in Katz v. Cor. of Immigration, 245 Fed.
316. It seems clear that this is a matter subject only to action by
the State. The touchstone for such suppression or abatement is the
police power inherent in sovereignty to make regulations guarding
the public health, public safety, public morals and general welfare,
including always the suppression of nuisances.
Discretion of Court Limited.-The sole distributee of a deceased
person's estate nominated a trust company to act as administrator
thereof. The court made such appointment, but against the protest
of said distributee appointed' a co-administrator. In view of the
statutory right of the distributee to make such nomination, the court
has no discretion in the matter, unless it be shown that said nominee
is an unfit person to perform the duties of personal representative.
Neither the magnitude of the estate nor the fact that an inheritance
tax thereon is due the State raises any presumption that the nominee
of the distributee is incompetent. The fitness of the nominee, and
no other consideration, determines whether or not the court may
exercise its own discretion.
Louisville Trust Co. v. Bingham, 178 Ky. 573.
Code Provision Mandatory.-The answer in an action was not
filed within the period required by law. Later an answer was found
in the clerk's office, endorsed in the name of the clerk and dated
as if it had been filed in due time; it had been left there without
the knowledge of the clerk or his deputy after the expiration of
the statutory period. Held, that the answer should be stricken from
the record and given no effect whatever.
Allen v. Haddix, 178 Ky. 389.
Supreme Court Upholds Draft.-As the Law Journal goes to
press, a dispatch is sent from Washington tothe effect that the
Supreme Court in a unanimous opinion, delivered by the Chief Jus-
!tice, has upheld the validity of the selective service act. Although
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the decision of our highest tribunal on this constitutional question
has not been published, the press report would indicate that the
eminent Chief Justice followed in the main the line of argument
referred to in Kentucky Law Journal, Vol. VI, pages 10 and 57.
Was Insurance Contract Violated?-It was stipulated in an
insurance policy on an automobile that said automobile should not
be rented-or hired for passenger service of any kind. Without the
knowledge of the-policy holder, his chauffeur used the automobile on
one extraordinary occasion in apparent violation of the insurance
contract, by carrying passengers for hire. At the end of the journey,
when the service, paid for by the passengers, had been completed,
the car burned. The court held that this single act on the part of
the servant was not sufficient to forfeit the master's right to re-
covery on his contract of insurance.
Crowell v. Maryland Motor Car Ins. Co., 85 S. E. 37, 169 N.
C. 35.
Who Is Capable of Negligence?-A twelve-year-old boy in
Pennsylvania climbed into a moving wagon loaded with heavy
barrels. When the driver saw him he seems to have applied the
lash in such a manner as to have frightened the boy into jumping
from the wagon. Inleaving the wagon he was injured, and brought
suit to recover therefor. Held, that it was error to direct a verdict
for the defendant, since the boy being under fourteen years of age
and of immature judgment was incapable of realizing the danger
of his action, and therefore is "not chargeable with contributory
negligence," although "technically he was a trespasser." The
court could not grant a peremptory instruction, but the facts' must
go to the jury for decision.,
McCable v. Cain, 95 Atl. 574.
Common Law Settles Point.-The. deceased wife owned two
pieces of real property, one of which she devised to her husband,
but the will contained no reference to the other. Could he assert
curtesy right in the latter? Held, that his taking under the will
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in no way prevented his hssertion of curtesy right in the undevised
portion of the estate. The will contained no provision from which
it could have been inferred that the devise was in lieu of curtesy.
The statute providing for election by the widow between-devise and
dower in no way changed the property rights of a widower, and the
common law still prevails as to this case.
Voss v. Stortz, 197 S. W. 964, 177 Ky. 541.
Improper Argument.-In the New York case of People v. IVil-
son, 111 N. E. 243, the prosecuting attorney appealed to the jury
for a death sentence on the ground that if defendant were guilty of
first degree murder there was "no sense in burdening the State"
by keeping him in prison. The appellate court said:
"We cannot understand how a prosecuting officer, with any
true conception of the high duties of his office, could thus appeal
to the jurymen to take into account the expense of maintaining a
person in a penal institution as a consideration which should weigh
with them in determining whether their verdict should be murder
in the first degree, which would result in the defendant's death, or
of some lesser degree of crime which would result in penal servi-
tude."
Threat to Jury Improper.-In prosecuting an alleged violation
of a local option law the prosecuting attorney said to the jury:
"If you don't convict the defendant in this case, I am going to
have you all indicted and sent to the penitentiary for perjury."
An objection by opposing counsel to the above threat was sustained,
but the judge did not reprimand the offender and subsequently re-
fused to deliver a special instruction to the jury to disregard the ob-
jectionable statement. The accused having been convicted, the
Court of Criminal Appeals held that the trial judge's failure to
reprimand and refusal of the special instruction constituted reversi-
ble error. The offense was a gross breach of decorum and an insult
to judicial dignity; it also prejudiced the right of the defendant to
a fair trial.
Flores v. State (Tex.) 198 S. W. 575.
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Not Quantity But Use.-A package containing fourteen gallons
of whisky, marked as is required by Section 2569-B, Sub-section 2,
Kentucky Statutes, was delivered by a common carrier to one man.
Was the quantity delivered sufficient to justify a conviction under
the statute? Held, that the gravamen of the offense consists not
in the quantity delivered, but in the manner of disposal of the
liquor after its receipt by the consignee. In the absence of incrimi-
nating facts or circumstances adduced in corroboration of the evi-
dence of quantity, the judgment of conviction was reversed by the
Court of Appeals. The statute imposes no limit as to quantity, but
intended use and knowledge on the part of the carrier of such in-
tended use constitute the ground on which a conviction must be
sought. This point had never been presented to the Court of Ap-
peals before.
Adams Express Co. v. Cor., 178 Ky. 59, 198 S. W. 556.
Situs of Sale.-The appellant was convicted in the circuit court
of having beer in his possession for the purpose of selling it in local
option territory, in violation of Section 2557-B, Sub-section 2, Ken-
tucky Statutes. Possession of the beer and the fact that the appel-
lant had taken mail orders for it from the purchasers were ad-
mitted, but it was claimed for him that the sale was effected in
another State when and where the consignor delivered the beer to
a common carrier. Such a transaction would have been within the
law. But the case turned upon the point that upon receipt of the
beer in the local option territory the appellant took possession of it
and delivered it to the various purchasers. It was not claimed that
this service was paid for by the consignees, and the Court of Ap-
peals affirmed the decision of the trial court that the appellant was
the agent of the consignor and therefore was guilty as charged in
the indictment.
Celli v. Commonwealth, 178 Ky. 567.
